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The Michelstaedter Enigma 
Thomas Harrison 
If ever there was one who, in Nietzsche's words, was born 
posthumously it was Carlo Michelstaedter. And doubly so: The first 
birth was a natural one, which for a variety of reasons he experienced 
as death. The second was the result of critical "exhumations," repeated 
discoveries of his work in the decades that have ensued since his sui-
cide in 1910. The most recent phase of this second coming begins 
when his sister Paula dies in 1972 and bequeaths Michelstaedter's 
manuscripts and paintings to her son Carlo Winteler. He, in turn, 
donates them to the Biblioteca Civica di Gorizia, where an archive is 
promptly established as the Fondo Michelstaedter. Two years later 
Professor Sergio Campailla takes over the task of putting order into 
the works, and the complete writings of Michelstaedter begin to be 
published by Adelphi Edizioni in Milan. His drawings, paintings, and 
biography also come to light. Campailla himself writes three definitive 
studies of the unusual artist. 1 
In the wake of the impressive advances of the Fondo 
Michelstaedter, now directed by Dr. Antonella Gallarotti, a question 
confronts all those who work in the field of modern Italian: Is 
Michelstaedter truly a figure of singular artistic stature or just an inter-
esting anomaly? Is he part of our century's cultural fodder or can we 
bypass his work without any significant loss? 
The enigmas embedded in the Michelstaedter phenomenon 
make these questions all but unavoidable. He is not only an Italian, 
but also a Jew and, by citizenship, an Austro-Hungarian. He is as 
much of a painter and a poet as a philosopher. A great celebrator of 
life, he is also the consummate nihilist of Western history. As philoso-
phers like Croce and Gentile recognized in the twenties, the celebrated 
work Michelstaedter wrote as a dissertation for the Universita degli 
Studi di Firenze (La persuasione e la rettorica, finished literally on the 
eve of his death at age twenty-three) is anything but systematic. 2 It 
proposes, but describes it in a way that is impossible to practice. 
Michelstaedter demands that his life live up to his thought, but 
respects no thought not already spontaneously prompted by life. He 
inveighs against the temptations of rhetoric in one of the most rhetori-
cal pieces of writing we have. Advocating independence of mind, he 
bases his arguments on classical sources. Insisting that knowledge is 
relative to the knower, he postulates universal, independent, meta-
physical truths. Finally, while expressing an overweening contempt 
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for language, he takes his words seriously to the point of being ready 
to sacrifice literally everything for them. 
To make matters worse, Michelstaedter denies us the aesthetic, 
reader's distance we are used to enjoying. His categorical, moralizing 
descriptions of life force us to decide at once: either he is right or he is 
wrong. We cannot assimilate his views without changing our thinking. 
Scoffing at everything most people accept when not living intellectual-
ly, Michelstaedter obliges us to consider whether we can find a place 
for his radical positions in the pictures we have already built of the 
world. And this, too, is why the question of his contemporary rele-
vance must be addressed directly. 
To a great extent, this question is already answered by the very 
nature of the most recent Michelstaedter readings. They show 1) that 
Michelstaedter has acquired international dimensions and 2) that he 
has been deeply assimilated into important debates of contemporary 
philosophy. Three readings in particular-amon~ ten or so book-
length studies that have followed Campailla's work -bring these two 
dimensions of the Michelstaedter renaissance into high relief: Daniela 
Bini's Carlo Michelstaedter and the Failure of Language, the articles pub-
lished in the pages of Differentia by the philosopher Mario Perniola, 
and the two essays by another of Italy's most eminent rhilosophers, 
Massimo Cacciari, in his recent French collection, DPAN. Bini's study 
is the most complete and contextualized monograph to date (and the 
first in English) on the entire extent of Michelstaedter's artistic 
achievements. Cacciari' s and Perniola' s studies show manners in 
which Michelstaedter's thinking has been appropriated by contempo-
rary philosophy. In one way or another, all future interpretations of 
Michelstaedter will have to pass through these three decisive recuper-
ations. Here I want only to initiate this passage, suggesting additional 
byways in the process. 
In the face of the interpretive difficulties attending the work of 
Michelstaedter, Daniela Bini's sensitive treatment of this figure in her 
recent book comes as a remarkable achievement. It covers the full 
range of issues attending Michelstaedter's work; it preserves unflinch-
ing aplomb in the face of his paradoxes; it reads as an elegant narra-
tive, recounting each twist and turn in Michelstaedter' s artistic, bio-
graphical, and spiritual development. Most important, perhaps, it 
performs precisely that act of contextualization which Michelstaedter 
requires of his audience, convincingly demonstrating the numerous 
ties between his work and that of towering figures of our spiritual tra-
dition (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; Heraclitus and Parmenides; 
Buddha and Christ; Leopardi and Pirandello). Here is an extraordinar-
ily complete vision of Michelstaedter in European context, providing 
not only exemplary treatment of the difficult arguments of La persua-
sione e la rettorica but also in-depth analyses of his poetry and visual 
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art. In fact, Bini's study will remain a model and primary source for 
those who would engage in any detailed examination of 
Michelstaedter's artistic work. Both on the visual and the literary 
front, it offers a consistently acute commentary to the numerous con-
tributions of this "comet in the sky" of early twentieth century Italian 
art. 
Bini's assessment of Michelstaedter's importance is strongly 
affirmative. His philosophy is given eminent credit, likened not only 
to his great pre-Socratic models, but also to the two masters of our cen-
tury, Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 5 His drawings and 
paintings are compared to those of the commanding Expressionists, 
Oscar Kokoschka, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and Erich Heckel. His poet-
ry is illuminated by references to Eugenio Montale. 
The concluding sentence of Bini's panoramic study brings 
Michelstaedter directly within the purview of issues with which we, in 
the United States, are particularly at home: issues of linguistic negativ-
ity and difference associated with a whole line of thinkers from 
Georges Bataille to Jacques Derrida, from Maurice Blanchot to 
Emmanuel Levinas. "It is not too farfetched to state," writes Bini, "that 
Blanchot's L'ecriture du desastre and even Bataille's central idea of the 
insuperable difference of the negative had their conscious sacrificial vic-
tim in Carlo Michelstaedter" (268). The dust cover of the book fore-
grounds the connection, introducing Michelstaedter as "a forerunner 
of Blanchot, Bataille, and Derrida." Granted, these are the publisher's 
words, not the author's, but it is still clear that Bini gives 
Michelstaedter a privileged place in what we can call, in the broadest 
philosophical sense, the twentieth-century critique of the logocentric 
tradition. 
Michelstaedter's place in this critique relies on the opposition 
between the key terms of his dissertation: persuasion and rhetoric. In 
Bini's reading, persuasion is akin to the existentialist notion of authen-
ticity. To be persuaded is to act in accordance with the true nature of 
our being, to say and do only what we really believe, to commit our-
selves first and foremost to the reality of our deepest, most inalienable 
self. Rhetoric, on the other hand, encompasses the mass of practical 
and theoretical procedures, concessions, and delusions informing the 
greater part of all cognitive traffic-whether the scientific belief in fact, 
the self-rationalizing ethics of business and pleasure, or the simple 
faith that life can be properly reflected in the understanding. 
What would seem to account for Michelstaedter's contempo-
raneity (if not postmodernity) is his vision of both the ubiquity and the 
inadequacy of all such rhetoric. Hope though we may to translate per-
suasion into principles, systems, or practical suggestions, it is entirely 
off-limits to words-to rhetoric. Persuasion, writes Bini, is "not an 
intellectual category, but a moral category. It belongs to the realm of 
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ethics, and it cannot be explained" (33). And again, "The nature of per-
suasione is, in fact, its very unspeakability . . . it cannot be known but 
must be lived" (35-36). On the surface, then, Michelstaedter's recogni-
tion of the unspeakability of all foundational matters puts him square-
ly in the company of the great thinkers of our century. But still, there is 
a difference between Michelstaedter and many of these others. He 
truly believed in the autonomous reality of this essential persuasion; 
others saw persuasion as a function of rhetoric, a delusion invented by 
words. 
At this point the question arises whether this elusive and appar-
ently inexpressible idea of persuasion names anything different from 
the final topic of speech and religion since time immemorial (the true 
nature of being and moral commitment, the real and not the apparent 
order of things). Whether called truth or persuasion or the absolute 
(and whether reserved for the seer, the saint, or the angel), it seems to 
have been theorized incessantly in human history. Michelstaedter him-
self "articulates" it with vatic insistence, sometimes even suggesting 
that the communication of persuasion is the sole hope for salvation. 
The hero of persuasion speaks to people "in the voice of their own 
pain, a voice distant to them." 6 Each word of the persuaded hero is 
"luminous" and "creates the presence of that which is distant" (PR: 
88). 
From Parmenides to Henri Bergson, the dream has been one and 
the same: a non-rhetorical world of meaning, identity, and being. If 
this is logocentrism, then Michelstaedter is one of its most adamant 
proponents of the last two thousand years. Here, at least, nothing 
could be further from the deconstruction of linguistic metaphysics 
which marks our era . Michelstaedter's resolution, in his own words, is 
"to give back to words their original meanings" (20). If Christ and 
Socrates offer models of persuasion, it is partially, Bini explains, 
because "they alone did not entrust their thought to the written word" 
(20). 
The idea of persuasion itself does not grow more persuasive 
when placed off-limits to language. It does not become more vibrant 
when identified with the miracles of organic vitality. Radically differ-
ent from the modes by which life typically forces us to operate, notes 
Bini, "persuasion seems not to belong to men" (24); even so, it is men 
who have devised the notion, and in countless articulated forms, some 
sacrificing their lives to it,7 others arguing that it can be achieved in the 
speechless purity of passionate, spontaneous action. Michelstaedter 
even appears to suggest that persuasion might have been more the 
rule than the exception before philosophers like Plato chose to sepa-
rate theory from practice (Jean-Jacques Rousseau would have cast the 
fateful date back earlier). Michelstaedter's Socrates is precisely an 
example of how such persuasion can belong to men . And this, com-
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ments Bini, is because "Socrates' theoretical and ethical goals coincide; 
his life was the enactment of his theory. He was a real persuaso" (26 ). 
Today, after decades of phenomenological thinking (inaugurated 
in the very years in which Michelstaedter was writing his disserta-
tion), one wonders whether his distinction between theory and prac-
tice is the most useful way to understand the structure of human expe-
rience. Now it appears more likely that practice is always motivated 
by theory in some way or other-always dependent on vision, inten-
tion and purpose, even in animals. Theory, too, appears always to 
serve some practical interest. If anything, a pressing intellectual task 
today is that of embracing the interconnections of the terms, discover-
ing a way to conceive of the complexities of human behavior outside 
of the difference or separation. 
Assuming, however, that occasionally this spontaneous, undif-
ferentiated fusion of theory and practice is mercifully accorded to 
experience (in ecstasy, savagery, and Zen), the problems still linger. To 
what extent does it make sense to extrapolate from this experience of 
unity, as Michelstaedter does, a "one", fundamental state of being 
underlying the two-ness, three-ness, and thousandfold variety of more 
common, or "rhetorical", experience? (Something like this question led 
one thinker of our century who was most truly inclined to mysticism, 
Martin Buber, to abandon the early monistic metaphysics of his Daniel, 
1913, for the dialogical historicity of I and Thou, 1923.) Besides, when 
philosophers and moralists have called for a correspondence between 
theory and practice they have usually had in mind the capitulation of 
one to the other (more specifically, of practice to theory). Noble as the 
intention may be, one would also like to see the operation moving, for 
once, in the opposite direction (making theory answer to practice). 
Here Michelstaedter remains regrettably on the far side of the fence. 
Understood as ethical authenticity, persuasion has difficulty dis-
engaging itself not only from the idea of theoretical truth (i.e., the intu-
ited or experienced true nature of being) but also from the idea of a 
self-governing subject. The authentic, autonomous person to whom 
Michelstaedter advises us to conform our behavior now appears to be 
more a fiction abstracted from all the contingencies ordinarily consid-
ered constitutive of selfhood: cultural tradition and prejudice, learning 
and historical fortune , winding existential ways, the existential insta-
bilities of care, emotion, and fear. Michelstaedter condemns all of these 
components of identity as rhetorical additions, whisking his hero 
away into the ethereal zones of divine self-standing: The persuaded 
self is one who "must create himself and the world, which does not 
exist before him : he must be master and not slave in his house" (PR: 
73). And this belief in authentic self-making is another reason why 
Michelstaedter is not as deconstructive as he often seems. He never 
accepted the "ambivalence" (21) of that historical rhetoric in which all 
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existence is caught, that hermeneutical reading and writing of life 
which is complicitous with-if not responsible for-every intellectual 
ideal. If he had truly accepted the ambivalence of rhetoric, as Bini 
claims, the story she recounts would not hold half as well as it actually 
does. 
The story is a compelling one, beginning with Michelstaedter the 
philosopher and ending with the poet and artist. In writing La persua-
sione e la rettorica, Michelstaedter runs up against a tragic paradox that 
he cannot escape without abandoning his own vehicle of communica-
tion: conceptual reason can never bridge the distance that separates it 
from the absolute it strives to articulate. This paradox, in turn, reval-
orizes Michelstaedter 's work in poetry and drawing, those activities 
which have generally been ranked second to his thinking. Bini, how-
ever, sees them, and not the dissertation, as the genres in which 
Michelstaedter invested his greatest resources. We know, for example, 
that the concepts of philosophy struck him as "dead bodies without 
souls" (10). Poetry, by contrast, extended the promise of a "synthetic 
image; the image that does not explain, but evokes; the image that 
does not claim the assent of theoretical reason, but hopes for that of 
the feelings, through which truth can often speak with a more effective 
voice" (10). At the very end of Michelstaedter's trajectory-away, that 
is, from the sterility of language-lie his portraits of living individuals. 
It was in these hundreds of sketches "that Michelstaedter was to find 
his authentic form of expression, the means by which he could finally 
defeat rettorica. With pencil or black chalk, the simplest of tools, he 
could try to catch the fleeting spark of the soul and with rapid strokes 
fix it on paper" (10). The culminating chapter of Bini's book, examin-
ing Michelstaedter's work in that visual medium where "between the 
subject portrayed and the beholder there is no longer any rhetorical 
mediation" (10), is appropriately called "The Authenticity of 
Drawing." 
Here, too, a deconstructive sensibility would have to ask: If the 
division between signs and meanings is as absolute as Michelstaedter 
claims it is, would it not apply to drawing as well? Doesn't even a 
visual representation give us only the body of a person, not the soul 
(or the image of a body, the projection, as it were, of one "I" onto 
another)? If Michelstaedter had truly accepted the ambivalence of 
rhetoric, he might have had no ground at all for privileging drawing 
over writing, for both operate equally under the sway of the sign-
revealing and hiding at once . That "communication from within" (216) 
at which Expressionist artists aimed is as impossible to achieve in 
drawing as in philosophy. 
Nevertheless, Bini is certainly right about Michelstaedter 's 
attraction to the sketch. There is a sense in which the portrait tries to 
lay hands on the living core of an individual in a way that philosophy 
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generally does not (over and beyond the efforts of Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, and the dialogical Plato). It is also true that an artistic 
arrangement of signs can overcome the stereotypical associations of 
those signs themselves, especially the associations accruing to the 
semantics of speech. But here the question is simply this: How com-
mitted was Michelstaedter to exploring such arrangements? His poet-
ry is not Dino Campana's or Giuseppe Ungaretti's. It is not visionary 
or hermetic, but conceptual and cerebral, often rawly allegorical, artic-
ulated in many of the same terms as his philosophy: 
Io son solo, lontano, io son diverso-
altro sole, altro vento e piu superbo 
volo per altri deli e la mia vita ... 
Ma ora qui che aspetto, e la mia vita perche non vive, 
perche non avviene? 
Che e questa luce, che e questo calore, 
questo ronzar confuso, questa terra, 
questo cielo che incombe? M'e straniero 
l' aspetto d' ogni cosa, m' e nemica 
questa natura! basta! voglio uscire 
da questa trama d'incubi! la vita! 
la mia vita! il mio sole!8 
I am alone, distant, different-
another sun, another wind 
my life is a prouder flight through other skies ... 
But it is here, now, that I wait, 
my life, why does it not live, 
why does nothing happen? 
What is this light, this heat, 
this confused buzzing, this earth, 
this sky which hangs so heavily above us? 
The appearance of things 
is strange to me; 
An enemy to me, this nature, 
Enough! I want to go, to escape 
this nightmare plot which is life! 
My life! My sun! 
[translated by Elizabeth Pallitto] 
While these may not be his most fortunate lines, even when con-
sidering Michelstaedter's poetry as a whole we find that it rarely 
embodies persuasion (as art presumably would, in a classical unity of 
form and content). Instead, it speaks around it-and less persuasively 
in most cases than his prose. 
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And what of the idea that truth might speak more effectively in 
poetry, where it appeals to the feelings rather than reason? But if the 
entire polemic of La persuasione e la rettorica is directed against the irra-
tionality and cowardice of feeling! Bini herself sometimes agrees with 
Campanilla that Michelstaedter committed suicide precisely because 
he was unable to tolerate the autonomy of his feelings (especially 
wrath, resentment, and guilt). One can even imagine a scenario in 
which the chronologically last Michelstaedter-the Michelstaedter of 
La persuasione, who limited his readings to the Gospels, Tolstoy, and a 
handful of moral, theoretical texts-argues that poetry is a spiritually 
immature form of expression, a language of emotional plaint rather 
than of firm and stable conviction. 
Similar considerations can be applied to his drawings. The vast 
majority of them are caricatures-attacks on stereotypes, not positive, 
alternative visions. Instead of a coincidence of form and content, they 
represent a schism (a procedure Bini eloquently glosses by reference to 
Pirandello's umorismo, psychoanalytic theory, and the formal distor-
tions of Expressionistic art). The suspicion remains that, up to the end, 
Michelstaedter never succeeded in lifting his art and his poetry above 
the conceptual deadlock of persuasion and rhetoric (which did, howev-
er, grow eloquent in La persuasione). He never succeeded in persuading 
himself of the persuasive power of these forms of rhetoric. (This is, of 
course, speaking of the whole; there are striking exceptions, where 
Michelstaedter shows himself as truly the equal of his artistic contem-
poraries, especially the portraits of himself and his family of the last 
three years. Not surprising, though, these are more than sketches.) 
And this brings us to a question that no discussion of 
Michelstaedter is able to avoid, namely, the question of the final out-
come of Michelstaedter's spiritual journey, crowned by suicide. On the 
one hand, Bini recognizes that a literal commitment to persuasion can 
only be deadly. Michelstaedter "knows that to make himself an 
absolute being is to negate himself as a finite being, that to make him-
self an eternal being is to negate himself as becoming. Michelstaedter's 
suicide seems at this point to have been a coherent and logical conse-
quence" (39-40). On the other hand, she is not willing to interpret his 
death as an inherently philosophical gesture. Acquainted as few others 
with the torments by which Michelstaedter's mind was racked, she 
interprets his suicide as probably a confession that he was unable to 
live up to his highest ideal of ethical unity. Here Bini takes issue with 
another, common reading of his suicide as a logical exemplification of 
the same ideal, or as a symptom of the nihilism inherent in persuasion 
itself. To believe in this unity of theory and act, writes Bini, is only "to 
fall prey to the systematic fallacy that mocks postmodernists" (259), 
namely, the assumption that since Michelstaedter insisted on an 
absolute coherence of theory and practice he must also have enacted 
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that coherence in his own, final gesture. While the objection is well 
taken, one also wants to ask why we should want to deny 
Michelstaedter such coherence at the one moment when he made the 
most absolute decision of his life. To be sure, suicide is always an 
admission that practice (life) is not conforming to theory. The signifi-
cant difference in Michelstaedter's case is that his own theories left 
him virtually no practical space in which to pursue the match. By con-
sidering persuasion something that practice could never live up to 
(and insisting that there is no other value in life whatsoever) 
Michelstaedter foreclosed all of his possibilities. In this sense his sui-
cide was plainly occasioned by philosophy (irrespective of what other, 
concrete reasons might also have accompanied it, such as a quarrel 
with his mother the morning of the act, or a lethal disease from which 
he may have been suffering). In short, it is impossible to divorce 
Michelstaedter's suicide from the negative judgments he passes on life 
at every turn. "There is no need," he writes in La persuasione, "to con-
tinue a life which, wanting in everything, is revealed not to be life" 
(70). 
What would it have taken for Michelstaedter to continue to live? 
Had he not chosen to believe that the absolute, the eternal, and the 
true were the stuff of which life is made, the intolerable contradiction 
of experience would have vanished-and, along with it, perhaps also 
the suicidal temptation. But short of this, Michelstaedter would have 
had to find a way to valorize the contradiction between rhetoric and 
persuasion, the rhetorical failure of existence itself. Bini suggests that 
silence was the inevitable consequence of his philosophical battle-
and silence is a stand-in for death. But one could also claim that only 
there, where silence and death seem to be the only solutions to the 
absurdity of experience, do art and life begin. Only there does one 
assume personal responsibility for shaping meaning, for actualizing a 
truly persuasive form of life. To continue to live Michelstaedter would 
have had to cease railing against language, convention, and interpreta-
tion. He would have had to shift more of his energy toward the produc-
tion of art. His talents were so exceptional that he would have found 
remarkable ways to lift his painting, poetry, and philosophy above the 
phantoms by which they were haunted-to coerce them, as it were, 
into a new type of vitality. Where negativity, duplicity, and rhetoric are 
prime movers in the demand for meaning and life, there creativity 
accepts its true challenge. Incidentally, Adriano Tilgher recognized 
something of this in his review of La persuasione in La Stampa, 23 
December, 1922, p. 3. 
What emerges from Bini's study of the full range of 
Michelstaedter' s work is a sense that the relevance of his thinking 
today ultimately hinges on how persuasive we find his Hauptbegriff-
the moral and intellectual ideal of persuasion. In an age where, to bor-
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row Mario Perniola's sardonic words, "everything seems to be 
reduced . . . to the daily tactical ministering of the spheres of feelings, 
interest, and ideas which appear to be obvious," it is more difficult 
than ever to respond passionately to discussions of truth and unyield-
ing commitment. 9 We have become pragmatic through and through, 
cultivating only experiences and techniques we know to work. We 
humor only ideas we can translate into palpable results. It is in this 
type of setting that Perniola prescribes Michelstaedter as a curative. To 
do so, however, he must rethink the significance of persuasion. 
For Perniola persuasion is not a condition in which the self 
becomes what it most inalienably is-immune, as it were, to the allure 
of rhetorical deceit. Persuasion is essentially amor Jati, or love of fate: 
In Greek, persuade , or convince, is peftho. Originally the root peith- was 
only intransitive: it did not mean to convince someone, but to have trust, 
or to trust someone. The transitive use of the verb does not belong to the 
ancient Greek and represents a later change. The fundamental meaning 
of persuasion is trust. To be persuaded thus means to have great trust, to 
be or remain in a state of trust. (5: 27-28) 
Trust is not equivalent to the futural, messianic orientation of 
"faith"; it is a bearing toward "something already given, something 
present," a condition of a person "who feels safe because he can rely 
on a solid reality" (5: 28). 
This vision of persuasion sidesteps the tragic implications that 
Bini so carefully ferrets out from its textual descriptions. Gone are the 
speechless dilemmas, the beckoning of death, the self-immolation of 
Michelstaedter's persuaded heroes. And this is primarily because 
Perniola is interested in Michelstaedter as a model for a new type of 
project, one radically different from the two caught up in the battle 
between modernism and postmodernism, idealism and pragmatism, 
the "sixties" and the "eighties" of our century . 
The sixties and early seventies, claims Perniola, were modernist 
in demeanor: militant, revolutionary, and intent on the future, protest-
ing the present in deference to social and political ideals. The eighties, 
by contrast, were postmodernist: passeistes, dispassionately immersed 
in what has already come to pass, disillusioning or entertaining as the 
case may be. The postmodernism of the eighties, writes Perniola, 
"oozes with boredom . This total acquiescence and consent to universal 
inconsistencies, and this state of misery, when it comes to emotions 
and feelings," generates only flatness, emanating intellectual preten-
sions which somersault "in every direction" (3-4: 42). As we emerge 
from this postmodernist period, he claims, we may finally be able to 
grasp the "vitality and fecundity" of Michelstaedter's thinking for the 
nineties. Very simply, it consists in his call for a "strong feeling" for the 
present-or what neither the sixties nor the eighties respected. Strong 
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feeling offers an alternative to activism and passivism alike, both 
equally evasive. In Michelstaedter's idea of passionate commitment to 
what actually is at any moment, of trust in the phenomena composing 
historical presence, lies, for Perniola, the "point of departure of a new 
cultural tendency" (3-4: 41 ). 
What is implied by this strong feeling for the present? To begin 
with: an overcoming of obnoxious, self-assertive subjectivity (though 
not in the manner of "sentimental Postmodern softness," 3-4: 43). 
Perniola is almost alone in making an issue of Michelstaedter's cri-
tique of vitalistic subjectivity-the notion that human motivation can 
be anchored in needs, desires, or lust for power. If subjectivism means 
acting in accordance with some form of this psychological or biologi-
cal substratum (including the primal, Cartesian consciousness of the 
"thinking I"), then Perniola is right: Michelstaedter is not a subjec-
tivist. He wants people to be absorbed in things. "Persuasion," he 
writes, is "wanting to possess oneself in the things and in the things 
oneself" (qtd. 3-4: 44, though the citation is not exact: "veder oggetti-
vamente ... e l' estrema coscienza di chi e uno colle cose, ha in se tutte 
le cose: ... il persuaso: il dio," PR: 123). This externalized type of iden-
tity gives rise to a new immediacy of being, both phenomenologically 
and temporally, experienced quite humbly in listening to "that which 
emerges from the present, to that which is coming (sopraggiunge) hie et 
nunc, and to that which is manifested in things" (3-4: 43). 
This non-subjective feeling for temporal, phenomenological pres-
ence spills over into new types of commitment. One enters the "age of 
the thing" which ensues the postmodern "age of the image" by being a 
"high profile intellectual" (3-4: 47). Strong feeling issues into strong 
writing. In the nineties, strong writers replace the weak writers of the 
eighties as well as the maftres a penser of the sixties. Not authors or 
intellectuals in the classical sense, they are gatherers of traces, bearing 
witness to experience not in exclusively authorial forms but also in 
non-authorial ones (iconographic documentations, the intellectual' s 
library, tomb, and so on). In essence, a high-profile intellectual is not a 
subject at all but "a thing," entering into "direct contact ... between 
thought and the world of history" (3-4: 46, 49). Silencing all "inordi-
nate affections," desires, and opinions, this new type of thinker may 
even be more of a reader than a writer, making "him/ herself into the 
single conduit of phenomena, their place of transit, their gateway to 
phenomena which surprise, upset, and amaze us, which constantly 
present themselves in an unexpected and unpredictable way" (3-4: 49). 
The time for such non-subjective intellectuals is certainly long 
overdue. And yet, it is unclear how much sustenance they will find in 
Michelstaedter's example. He admittedly defends valuing the exclu-
sive reality of single instants of experience. As for whether there is any 
experience left to such instants, however, or whether he values the 
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phenomena they make present-this is another story. Michelstaedter 
radically rejects the worth of everything we ordinarily think of as char-
acterizing experience: the temporal progression of things, their perish-
ing and changing, their foot in the past and their step to the future. 
While he seems to recommend viewing every occurrence as "once and 
once only," there is, in his work, no love of experience which supports 
an analogous stance in Rilke or Nietzsche, no verbal or visual celebra-
tions of the wonders of unrepeatable presence. In fact, one can hardly 
imagine a more widespread condemnation of life as it appears (as it 
comes "to presence" on the human and organic level) than we find in 
this fiery antagonist of desire and need, of affection and adaptation, of 
dependence and insecurity. 10 In Michelstaedter's view, everything for 
which humans ordinarily live amounts to nothing. Moreover, all this 
nothing is a cowardly compensation for the dread of that nothing 
which truly is at any moment of time. To commit to the present in the 
manner of Michelstaedter's persuasion is also to commit to nothing. 
The nihilism which could have yielded amor fati is closer to amor vacui. 
Even the apparent non-subjectivism of this presential feeling 
runs into resistance from Michelstaedter's text, seeming more of a 
promise than a position his words decisively take. Though persuasion 
means having "nel possesso del mondo il possesso di se stesso" (PR: 
82), the emphasis remains much more strongly on the self than the 
world. A persuaded person, writes Michelstaedter, "cannot affirm 
himself in the affirmation of those [needs] which are given to him ... 
by a contingency external and prior to him ... he is alone in the desert, 
and must create everything on his own: god and country and family 
and water and bread" (PR: 70). Could it be that the goal of persuasion 
is a type of subjectivity after all, aiming "to affirm the person who pos-
sesses reason" (PR: 85)? Life must consist in "creating everything by 
oneself [da se, which also means "out of oneself"], not adapting to any 
way ... you have to create each thing: in order to possess your life as 
your own .... Christ saved himself because out of his own mortal life 
he was able to create the god: the individual" (PR: 103-04). 
While Perniola's strong, non-subjective feeling allows for the 
experience of what is distant, "foreign, other, different" (3-4: 44), in 
Michelstaedter this otherness is entirely generated from one selfsame 
self, now dilating to encompass the entire universe (a universe not 
composed of specific differences, but a limitless expanse of estrange-
ment, in which all cows and cats are black). The seeming "disappear-
ance of the subject" is thus at bottom a "possession of oneself" (3-4: 44, 
46), of oneself as pure spirit. This new philosophy of presence now 
appears to have more in common with the visions of saints and 
ascetics than with empirical love. As Bini has noted, Michelstaedter's 
sympathies are deeply Buddhistic (124-25, 245-28). 
Perniola's strong feeling stands "at the opposite pole of negative 
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thought and the various forms which it has recently adopted: crisis of 
reason, nihilism, weak thought, and so forth" (3-4: 48). How can we 
place his Michelstaedter back to back with the view presented by the 
very figure alluded to in the phrases "negative thought" and the "cri-
sis of reason" -Massimo Cacciari? We can, I believe, if we tie the posi-
tivity of Michelstaedter's professed ethic more closely to the negativity 
of his metaphysics. In his second essay for Differentia, Perniola makes 
this negativity more explicit than in the first. There he characterizes 
persuasion as a paradoxical convergence of movement and immobili-
ty. In the "radical extraneousness [of experience] from which it is 
impossible to escape," the persuaded self does indeed aspire to 
absolute autonomy and self-sufficiency (5: 27). The "liveliness and 
exteriority" of persuasion is necessarily and intimately tied to a 
descent into the abyss of one's innate insufficiency. And thus, the self-
energizing process of "becoming a flame" is ineluctably a "becoming 
stone," and articulates an enigmatic "synthesis of sensitivity and cold-
ness" (5: 29). 
What Perniola calls the enigma of Michelstaedter, Cacciari calls 
his aporia. One of the most single-minded philosophers of the 
absolute in recent memory (where the "absolute" is understood as the 
original and impossible object of philosophy and religion, the shape-
less, unspeakable goal of every concerted linguistic effort), Cacciari 
finds in Michelstaedter the same battle which is so often played out in 
the Habsburg culture to which the young philosopher belonged. 11 
With Cacciari we are closer to Bini's reading than Perniola' s. Here the 
opposition between, let us say, the one "true" way of persuasion and 
the many ways of discursive deception is so radical that the very 
notion of unifying theory and practice becomes unthinkable. 
Persuasion is not only "para-doxical," it is also para-rzhysin, writes 
Cacciari in the second of his two Michelstaedter essays. 2 Socrates, the 
persuaded one, is "atopos"; what he says "cannot take root" (102). The 
insuperable difference of persuasion that is built into the duplicity of 
peitho: a divine peitho on the one hand and the oscillating peitho of 
mortals on the other, ineluctably governed by the built-in require-
men ts of social and political interaction (98). For Cacciari, 
Michelstaedter severs the two voices of peitho in primordial fashion. 
No longer can there be any question of actualizing persuasion in feel-
ing or unified action. Between operari and the True Way, between work 
and health, remains an incommensurable distance. In truth what a 
person enacts in persuasion is nothing less than the immanent desert 
of the soul, or the silence of the very ground of the soul. "He wants to 
be autarkes .... he knows no Other to whom to address himself" (108). 
Persuasion thus takes up its place in the history of that tragic 
spirituality which runs from Aeschylus's Agamemnon to the absurd 
Christianity of Kierkegaard. La persuasione appears to be a unique 
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effort to reconcile pagan trust with Christian faith, peitho with pistis 
(107). Here Christ is far from a model for practicing what one preach-
es. Rather, Michelstaedter's Christianity is all contained in the super-
human nature of the love it proposes, in the maniacal courage of the 
freedom it urges. "The Christian God does not contradict life but 
requires an impossible true life" (109). And Michelstaedter' s aporia 
becomes that of "having to want the true Way, being able only to want 
it, and not being able to have it while wanting it" (110). 
In Cacciari's radical rhetoric (appropriate, I believe, to the funda-
mentality of the contradictions with which Michelstaedter is con-
cerned) lies a final, essential perception. The bind involved in the will 
to persuasion is the experience of persuasion itself. The only enact-
ment of persuasion lies in embracing its own impossibility. Cacciari 
sees this more clearly than others (and probably more clearly than 
Michelstaedter himself). To be persuaded is knowingly and willingly 
to suffer the impossibility of the condition itself. It is neither to dismiss 
the persuasive ideal as irrelevant to the pragmatic operations of the 
world nor to relegate it to philosophical theory. Rather, it is to show 
the dream in its ineffability, to keep it sacrosanct, to allow it to mark 
the limits of all knowledge and intuition-in short, to voice its silence. 
This is the "most ancient" persuasion of life, around which words 
turn. 
True life is not to be located in a Beyond that reason cannot 
attain; "true life, its perfection, is the accomplishment of this life: the 
impossible perfect satisfaction of its erga-to which no method can 
lead. Persuasion is the silence and peace of these words-and it 
reveals itself in them as the uncapturable 'dia logon' " (110). In still 
another way, persuaded life does not lie in an abstract alternative to 
the "sick" life of pain, desire, and need; it consists in "the coincidence 
in process between a person's existence and a radical endurance of the 
pain connected to this existence. The present of persuasion means 
being en energhia in pain, not beyond it" (82). 
Perniola and Cacciari do not disagree in viewing persuasion as 
an existential response to the perfect imperfection of the historical 
process (no less than Bini does). If anything, they disagree about how 
to understand this process. Perniola emphasizes its phenomenal com-
ing-into-being in an infinitely differentiated flow of autonomous 
things and appearances. Cacciari places the emphasis on its ontologi-
cal difference: the unthinkable gap between its being. Or perhaps the 
real difference lies here: just what to make of this inherently duplici-
tous presence. Perniola envisions an ethical response of strong partici-
pation.13 Cacciari is primarily concerned with what the presence 
inspires in the way of vision, before the issue of ethics has even been 
raised. 
In Cacciari's reading, every expression of persuasion is antinomi-
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an (where nomos is the law, the rule, the doxa to which meanings are 
typically reduced). What is "unauthentic," in other words, is not a par-
ticular use of language but language's very constitution (72). The clos-
est it can come to authenticity is to speak in recognition of its own 
futility. The most striking expression of this aporia (profusely revealed 
by the expressionist art of Michelstaedter's time) is the "knowledge" 
that he found intolerable-namely, the sense that the greatest close-
ness to meaning is achieved by the greatest rhetorical distance. The 
keeper of language must be pulled by the hair. 
When Virginia Woolf wrote that "in or about December, 1910, 
human character changed," she had something like this fight in 
rnind. 14 She did not mean that human nature had become different, but 
that the conventions by which it had once been represented had now 
broken down. Like Michelstaedter, the writers of the first decade of the 
century were left facing a new type of "Mrs. Brown without any 
method of conveying her to the reader" (332). 
Their suspicion her essence could not be depicted by a rhetoric of 
material or existential conditions explains the "breaking and falling, 
crashing and destruction" accompanying all literary efforts to rescue 
her from her material and linguistic entrapment (334).15 Thus, when 
confronting the art of the beginning of the century, Woolf advises, "we 
must reconcile ourselves to a season of failures and fragments. We 
must reflect that where so much strength is spent on finding a way of 
telling the truth, the truth itself is bound to reach us in rather an 
exhausted and chaotic condition." Mrs. Brown, in other words, will 
appear a little pale and dishevelled by the time her rescuers reach her. 
And, in the proximity of this rhetorical rescue operation, it will be 
above all "the sound of their axes that we hear" (335-36). 
This is the critical artistic moment which comes to expression in 
Michelstaedter (and which points ahead to an era in which crisis does 
not have to prove suicidal). Few artists make the sound of the axes as 
eloquent as Michelstaedter-in his conceptual dilemmas, in those 
drawings which Bini has brought to our attention, in the contortions of 
a style forged in prose. Among the lessons to be learned from the 
Michelstaedter of Bini, Perniola, and Cacciari today is also this one: 
that only in a redemption of rhetoric can the soul find its silent persua-
sion. 
NOTES 
1. On the history of the Michelstaedter Foundation, see the pamphlet by 
Antonella Gallarotti, II Fonda Michelstaedter della Biblioteca Civica (Gorizia: 
Dispensa dell'Universita della Terza Eta, 1990). On the Foundation's holdings, 
see Gallarotti, "Ricordare attraverso la carta: Carlo Michelstaedter," La speran-
za: Attraverso l'ebraismo goriziano, Catalogue of the exhibition in Gorizia, 7 July 
- 20 October, 1991 (Monfalcone, Italy: Edizioni della Laguna, 1991), 87-104. The 
editions of Michelstaedter's writings that have been published by Adelphi 
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Edizione in Milan, all edited by Sergio Campailla and (except for one) in inex-
pensive paperbacks, are La persuasione e la rettorica (1982), Epistolario (1983), 
Poesie (1987), and II dialogo de/la salute e altri dialoghi (1988). Sergio Campailla's 
own studies include Pensiero e poesia di Carlo Michelstaedter (Bologna: Patron, 
1973), A Jerri corti con la vita (Gorizia: Arti grafiche Campestrini, 1974), Scrittori 
giuliani (Bologna: Patron , 1980). Before Campailla, to be sure, a number of 
excellent studies of La persuasione had already seen the light. Alfredo Giuliani, 
the novissimo, had done his thesis on Michelstaedter in 1949 (Rome). Books 
had been written by Cerruti and others in the fifties and sixties. 
Michelstaedter's schoolmates Gaetano Chiavacci and Arangio-Ruiz had 
brought him to the attention of Italian philosophers and writers already in the 
twenties. For a complete bibliography of Michelstaedter criticism up to 1986, 
see Francesco Muzzioli, Michelstaedter (Lecce: Milella, 1987): 75-194. To date, 
the most ample collection of Michelstaedter's writings remains Opere, ed. 
Giovanni Chiavacci (Florence: Sansoni, 1958). A splendid catalogue of 
Michelstaedter's complete drawings and paintings, recently edited by 
Antonella Gallarotti, is L'immagine irraggiungibile: Dipinti e disegni di Carlo 
Michelstaedter (Monfalcone: Edizioni della Laguna, 1992). 
2. Giovanni Gentile's review of La persuasione e la rettorica appears in La 
Critica 20 (1922): 332-36. For Croce's review see the bibliography by Muzzioli 
cited above. 
3. In order of publication, the main studies since 1980 are: Cristina 
Benussi, Negazione e integrazione nella dialettica di Carlo Michelstaedter (Rome: 
Edizioni dell' Ateneo & Bizzarri, 1980); Claudio La Rocca, Nichilismo e retorica: 
II pensiero di Carlo Michelstaedter (Pisa: ETS, 1983); Piero Pieri, La differenza 
ebraica: Ebraismo e grecita in Michelstaedter (Bologna: Cappelli, 1984); Giorgio 
Brianese, L'arco e il destino: Interpretazione di Michelstaedter (Padova: Francisci, 
1985); Francesco Fratta, II dovere dell'essere: Critica de/la metafisica e istanza etica 
in Carlo Michelstaedter (Milan: UNICOPLI, 1986); Piero Pieri, Saggio su Carlo 
Michelstaedter (Bologna: Cappelli, 1989). One might also read the interesting 
novel by Claudio Magri s on Enrico Mereula, Michelstaedter's best friend from 
Gorizia, Un altro mare (Milan: Garzanti, 1991). 
4. Daniela Bini's book was published in Gainesville by the University 
Press of Florida in 1992. Mario Perniola's two essays are "Beyond 
Postmodernism: Michelstaedter, Strong Feeling, the Present," trans. by 
Daniela Bini and Renate Holub, and "Enigmas of Italian Temperament," trans. 
by Aninne Schneider . They appear, respectively, in Diff erentia 3-4 
(Spring/ Autumn 1989): 39-50 and Differentia 5 (Spring 1991): 19-30. Massimo 
Cacciari's DPAN: Meridiens de la decision dans la pensee contemporaine, 
trans. by Michel Valensi, has been published in Combas by Editions de l'Eclat, 
1992. The two essays it contains on Michelstaedter are "Interpretation de 
Michelstaedter" (63-86) and "La lutte 'sur' Platon: Michelstaedter et 
Nietzsche" (87-110). The first essay has appeared in Italian in the Rivista di 
estetica 22 (1986): 21-36. 
5. The idea of Michelstaedter as a precursor of Heidegger is first system-
atically argued, if not fully convincingly, by Ioachim Ranke, "II pensiero di 
Michelstaedter: Un contributo allo studio dell' esistenzialismo italiano," 
Giornale critico de/la filosofia italiana 41, no. 4 (1962): 518-39. Additional links are 
explored by La Rocca, Brianese, and Cacciari in the studies cited above. Ties 
between Michelstaedter and Wittgenstein, also largely problematic in nature, 
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have been drawn not only by Bini but also by Cacciari and La Rocca as well as 
Gianni Carchia, "Linguaggio e mistica in Carlo Michelstaedter," Rivista di 
estetica 21 (1981): 126-32. 
6. Carlo Michelstaedter, La persuasione e la rettorica, ed. by Sergio 
Campailla (Milan: Adelphi, 1982), 87. Hereafter citations from this text (abbre-
viated PR) will be identified parenthetically. 
7. It is worth noting that on his list of countless deluded "types" who 
function rhetorically-scientists and shopkeepers, educators and athletes-
Michelstaedter hardly finds room for priests and prophets. 
8. Carlo Michelstaedter, "Risveglio," lines 22-33, Poesie, 69-70. 
9. Mario Perniola, "Beyond Postmodernism: Michelstaedter, Strong 
Feeling, the Present," Differentia 3-4: 40. References to this and Perniola's other 
essay on Michelstaedter (fully documented in note 4) will henceforth be iden-
tified in parentheses, where the volume number of Differentia is followed by 
page numbers (thus, here, 3-4: 40). 
10. Even in the inorganic realm of chemicals, the very principle of life (as 
expressed, for example, in the tendency of hydrogen to "lust" after chloride 
and thus form the lethal compound hydrochloride) is suicidal (PR: 46-47). 
11. See Cacciari's penetrating study of Adolf Loos, Arnold Schoenberg, 
and a dozen other compatriots of Michelstaedter in Dalio Steinhof Prospettive 
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13. In Del sentire (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), Perniola elaborates at much 
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